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The FDA Knows Best. .. Or Does It? First Amendment
Protection of Health Claims on Dietary Supplements:
Pearson v. Shalala *
I. INTRODUCTION

Early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech recognized the American devotion
to the concept of the free flow of ideas. 1 As these cases articulate, the
democratic ideal rests on the belief that the people are sovereign in their
ability to sift through the varying expressions of their fellow citizenswhatever the motivation of the speaker-in order to glean true
information from among the deceptive chaff of blatantly false or merely
misleading communication. Many scholars note, however, that the
Founders seem to have adopted the Bill of Rights as a quick expediency
in order to convince the states to adopt the Constitution, which was
viewed as a harbinger of the immense power to be exercised by the
federal government, and, as a consequence, did not clearly consider the
meaning and nature of "speech" and other rights protected therein. 2
As a result of this lack of thoughtful intent, the definitional
development of these rights has been, by necessity, created through the
constitutional determinations of the Supreme Court. Jurisprudence in the
First Amendment freedom of speech analysis has been particularly
dynamic, as the courts have had to decide how to regulate the increasing
avenues of communications provided to the average U.S. citizen in the
information age. In recent decades, the Court has attempted to define
"speech" more concretely, or more expansively, and has created
classifications of speech that are accorded varying levels of First
Amendment protection based on the social value of the speech?
As the Supreme Court has developed this hierarchy of speech
protection under the First Amendment, regulation has become
*

Copyright © 2000 by Amber K. Spencer.
I. See Phillip J. Cooper, Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision and the Supreme Court's Free
Flow Theory of the first Amendement, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 359 (1992). See
also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some Fundamental First Amendment Problems,
47 MD. L.J. 1,22 (1971).
3. See generally Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
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increasingly complex, intruding in the ordinary affairs of U.S. domestic
life. The 'awe of the expert,' characteristic of the New Deal era, created a
system of administrative agencies interested in protecting the public from
the dangers of modern society, including dangers to public health and
safety. Ultimately, some argue that the administrative state has taken this
duty of protection to the extreme of protecting the individual citizen even
from himself or herself. Critics of the administrative state note that the
elevation of the 'expert' leads to the degradation of democracy and
diminishes the individual's ability to act in his or her own best interests
4
by making informed choices. These critics note that the goal of
regulatory agencies ought to first be to "ensure genuinely informed
choices, 'rather than to dictate outcome from Washington"' and that the
administrative state should establish a priority to be more dedicated to
5
"educative, rather than regulatory" functions.
The FDA's regulation of health claims on labels of dietary
supplements sits at the intersection of these two areas of debate-the
evolution of First Amendment speech protection and the effects of the
administrative state on democracy. The Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act (OSHEA) does not require dietary manufacturers to prove
the safety of the product before it reaches the shelf. Supplements are
placed in the same category as foods under the FDA regulatory scheme;
however, the health claim labeling requirements of the Dietary Labeling
and Education Act applying to dietary supplements were not repealed
with the OSHEA, and strict limitations on labeling remain in place.
Section II of this note focuses on the relevant history of the FDA
regulation of health claims on the labels of dietary supplements, as well
as the evolution of the commercial free speech strand of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Section III focuses on the facts of Pearson v.
Shalala, a 1999 decision in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, that
focuses the debate on commercial free speech and FDA regulation of
health claims. Section III outlines the facts and reasoning of the court in
Pearson. Sections IV and V explain the application of the Supreme
Court's Central Hudson test and its failure to encompass the complexity
of interests involved in this regulatory/free speech analysis. This section
will also explain why the Supreme Court should use the failure of the
Central Hudson test in this context to revise its notion of commercial
speech protection to better suit the government and public interests
involved. Section VI provides a summary of the author's reasons why the
agency should revise its standard of regulation in such cases in order to
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653 (1993).
5. ld.
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comply with the First Amendment, and why the agency should
reconsider its determination that mixed categories of speech, such as
health claims, should be provided a lower degree of First Amendment
protection than other categories of speech. The section will close by
suggesting that dietary supplements should be subjected to safety
approval by the FDA, while health claims should be permitted without
prior restraint and removal upon proof of falsity. Section VII concludes
the article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment and the Commercial Speech Doctrine

As noted earlier, the Bill of Rights was added as a quick addendum
to the Constitution in order to assuage fears of an overbearing federal
government and thereby to coax the states to ratify the Constitution. 6
Consequently, the Founders did not fully explicate the meaning of the
terms used therein. 7 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," and the definition of
the term "speech" is continuously evolving through the Supreme Court's
analysis in relevant cases.
Although the definition of speech, therefore, must by necessity be a
creation of the Court, one thing is clear: neither the plain language of the
Constitution nor the debates of the Founders differentiate between the
full First Amendment protection of "pure" speech and the lesser degree
of protection used for subcategories such as commercial speech, deemed
by the Court to be of less social worth. 8 This valuation of speech is
9
purely a creation of the Court.
While the Court has long recognized that, at times, a government
interest may justify the restriction of speech based on time, place and
manner, several justices, most notably Holmes and Brandeis, warned
against the evils of an over-censoring, patronistic government. 10 Scholars
and jurists alike, however, almost unanimously concede that the ability
6. See Bork, supra note 2, at 22.
7. See id.
8. Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. I,
6-7 (1986).
9. Some scholars even suggest the Founders did not ignore the high value of commercial
speech at all but valued it as highly as political expression. See Brian J. Waters, A Doctrine in
Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for
Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1647 (1997).
10. See Brandeis' discussion in Whitney v. California. 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring), cited in John M. Blim, Free Speech and Health Claims under the NLEA of
1990, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 733,749 n.l27 (1994); see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371; Abramf, 250
U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of the government to restrain free speech does not merely exist when "an
immediate check is required to save the country." 11 Government interests
such as the protection of public health and safety have traditionally
justified extensions of government regulatory authority .12
As Richard Posner noted in a Suffolk University Law Review article,
"the state must be allowed to restrain speech if necessary in order to
avert lesser catastrophes." 13 To 'avert' these 'lesser catastrophes,' the
Court has attempted to create a value system with core speech most
strongly exhibit[ing] the qualities of a public good at the top of the First
Amendment protection scheme with other lesser categories of speech
14
less protected. The Court first recognized commercial speech as a
distinct category worthy of limited protection in a case addressing the
publication of pharmaceutical prices by Virginia pharmacies. 15 The
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council brought a suit in 1974 to invalidate
a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists in the state from advertising the
prices of the drugs. The penalty for advertising drug prices was to be
found guilty of "unprofessional conduct" for the publication. 16
The Court defined commercial speech as speech that does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction." 17 Justice Blackmun, writing for
the court, relied mainly on the 'free flow of information' theory and the
notion that if we assume that the First Amendment is "primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy," the
Court could not devalue "concededly truthful information about entirely
18
lawful activity." With this decision, the Court noted that both the
speaker and the recipients of speech have a right at stake in the free flow
of commercial information. 19 The Court weighed the competing
government and public interests at issue and invalidated the Virginia
statute, determining that the court's patronistic reasons for restraining
. . were unacceptabl e. 20
commumcatwn
II. Abram~. 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340
(1986); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,485 (1995).
13. Posner, supra note 8, at 6.
14. See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Ronwnce: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, !05 HARV. L. REV. 554, 562 (1991).
15. Virginia State Bd. tif Pharnwcy, 425 U.S. at 748.
16. See id. at 752.
17. /d. at 752 n.2.
18. /d. at 773.
19. See id. at 756.
20. See Blackmun's statement that
the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their
being kept in ignorance ... There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that
people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that
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While the Court deemed commercial speech worthy of limited
protection under the First Amendment in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Justice Blackmun was
quick to assert that the time, place and manner restrictions imposed on
pure speech were equally applicable, if not more so, in determining
whether a regulation improperly abridges a commercial free speech
right. 21 In addition, Justice Blackmun presented two reasons why the
Court was choosing to provide a lesser degree of protection to
commercial speech than to other forms of expression: (1) commercial
speech is "more easily verifiable by its disseminator" and (2) commercial
speech may be "more durable than other kinds [of speech]." 22 As a result
of this objective verifiability and hardiness of commercial speech, Justice
Blackmun clearly stated that commercial speech is not entitled to the
usual prohibition against prior restraint, and that a speaker may be
required to attach disclaimers or other counter information to the speech
in order to combat possible deceptive effects. 23 Notwithstanding this
lesser protection, however, the Court forcibly agreed with the lower
court's determination that a State may not "completely suppress the
dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful
activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its
. .
,24
rectptents.
While the Court clearly recognized commercial speech as a category
deserving some degree of First Amendment protection in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun's opinion did not formulate a
clear standard of scrutiny for evaluating regulations that abridge
commercial speech. However, in 1980, in the case of Central Hudson
Gas v. Public Service Commission, the court formulated an intermediate
standard of scrutiny it would apply to regulations of commercial
speech. 25 The Central Hudson controversy arose during a severe fuel
shortage during which the New York Public Service Commission
prohibited electrical utilities from publishing promotional advertising
that heightened the aggregate demand for electricity. 26 In this case, the
government interest in regulation was substantially higher than the
patronistic interest asserted by the state of Virginia in Virginia State
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them.
Jd. at 769-70.
21. See id. at 771.
22. /d. at 772 n.24.
23. See id.
24. /d. at 773.
25. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
26. Seeid.at560.
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Board of Pharmacy. Before setting out the standard, the Court noted that
"[t]he protection available for particular commercial expression turns on
the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests
served by the regulation." 27 The Court then stated the test as follows: (1)
Is the communication worthy of First Amendment protection because it
is concerning lawful activity and not misleading? (2) Is the asserted
governmental interest substantial? (3) Does the regulation directly
advance the governmental interest asserted? (4) Is the regulation not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest? 28 If the answers to
prongs one and two are yes, the court will proceed to prongs three and
four. Otherwise, the analysis ends at prong two. The court determined in
Central Hudson that the Public Service Commission regulation did not
pass this test and was therefore invalid as a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendment. 29
From the very adoption of the test in Central Hudson, however,
several members of the Court noted the ambiguity inherent in its
language 30 and the difficulty in justifying the difference in the level of
protection accorded to commercial speech and that accorded to other
forms of truthful, non-misleading speech. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun stated that "[n]o differences between commercial
speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial
speech in order to influence public conduct through the manipulation of
the availability of information." 31 In other words, the government should
no more be able to suppress information in order to influence consumer
choice in a situation involving commercial speech than it may suppress
core speech, such as political speech, in order to influence public
conduct.
Also in 1980, the Court decided Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, in which Justice Rehnquist made his muchdebated statement that the "greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of
32
casino gambling." In this case, the Court determined under the Central
Hudson scheme that the Puerto Rican legislature's regulation disallowing
the advertisement of gambling in Puerto Rico was valid under the First
Amendment. 33 The government interest asserted under the Central
Hudson test was the legislature's belief that gambling would produce
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

/d. at 563.
!d. at 566.
See id. at 572.
See also Blim, supra note 10, at 747-49.
Central Hudson, 448 U.S. at 578.
478 U.S. at 345-46.
See id. at 332.
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"serious and harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the
Puerto Rican citizens." 34 Although Justice Rehnquist's "greater/lesser"
formulation seems excessively broad enough to encompass nearly all
commercial speech, this logic has been limited in subsequent cases by
the notion that this principle is applicable only when the commercial
activity involved is never in the citizens' best interest. 35
Further cases established the concept that while inherently
misleading communication is not protected under the Central Hudson
standard, potentially misleading information is protected to some extent.
If truthful advertising related to lawful activities is potentially
misleading, "the States may not place an absolute prohibition . . . on
potentially misleading information if the information also may be
presented in a way that is not deceptive.'.3 6 However, in Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, a 1989 case, the
Court determined that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the
appropriateness of the means to the government's asserted end, was to be
evaluated under a "reasonable fit" standard and not a "least restrictive
means" standard. 37
The Court has recognized in subsequent cases that complete
suppression is often not acceptable under the Fox "reasonable fit"
standard. For instance, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 38, a 1977 case,
the Supreme Court had disapproved of the State Bar's decision to
discipline several attorneys who advertised their fees for certain legal
services. The Court took this action because it disapproved of the notion
that "the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of
advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted
with correct but incomplete information." 39 The Court went on to
determine that the advertisement was not inherently misleading and
therefore, the "preferred remedy is more disclosure rather than less." 40 In
other words, if complete suppression is chosen over disclaimers, the
government regulation is subject to question because it used the most
restrictive means available to meet the government purpose. Later cases,
such as In Re R.M.J, decided by the Court in 1982, further clarify the
Court's position that the states may regulate commercial speech "in a

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Jd. at 341.
Blim, supra note 10, at 756.
Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650,655 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977).
/d. at 376.
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manner no more extensive than reasonably necessary to further
substantial interests." 41
B. History of Congressional Legislation and FDA Regulation

The courts have held that health claims on dietary supplement labels
fall under the rubric of commercial speech, according it a lesser level of
scrutiny than 'pure' speech,42 although the wisdom of this decision is
questioned by many scholars who argue that health labels are partly
informational and partly commercial and should therefore be protected
43
under a more rigorous level of scrutiny. The federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has long taken a hostile stance against the
inclusion of health claims on dietary supplement labels. A dietary
supplement was classified as a drug under the Pure Food and Drugs Act
of 1906,44 if it was "intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or
prevention of disease of either man or other animals." 45 However, the
courts paid little heed to the food/drug classification and few health
claims were litigated under the 1906 Act because the burden of proving
falsity and fraudulence rested on the govemment. 46 With the federal
47
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, however, the definition of a
'drug' was extended and the government's burden of proof was lessened
to require only proof of falsity, and not fraudulence. 48
The Drug Amendments of 1962 required pre-market approval of the
effectiveness and safety of a drug with the burden of proof placed on the
sponsor. The standard of proof was so high that it was nearly impossible
for a health claim for a food or supplement to satisfy the required proof
49
of a drug claim. Because of this, health claims were virtually prohibited
under the 1962 Amendments. The FDA determined in 1979, after
holding joint hearings with the FTC on health claims, that scientific
methods of verifying health claims were not sufficiently sophisticated at

41. In re R.M.l., 455 U.S. 191,207 (1982).
42. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).
43. See Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific
Expression and the Twilixht Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433 (1990); R. George
Wright, Freedom and Culture: Why We Should Not Buy Commercial Speech, 72 DENY. U. L. REV.
137 (1994); Edward Dunkelberger & Sarah E. Taylor, The NLEA, Health Claims and the First
Amendment, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 631 (1993).
44. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
45. !d. See also Richard M. Cooper, et a!., History of Health Claims Rexulation, 45 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 655, 658.
46. See id.
47. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 ( 1938).
48, See Cooper, eta!., supra note 45, at 658.
49. See id.
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that time to justify the inclusion of health claims on products without
. Iead"mg consumers:so
nus
In 1984, Kelloggs opened the floodgates of health claims in
advertising by placing a claim on boxes of All-Bran stating that the
cereal was high in fiber and that the National Cancer Institute had
established that a high-fiber diet could reduce the risk of some types of
cancer. 51 Kelloggs did not consult with the FDA before attaching the
claim to its cereal boxes, yet the agency took no action against Kelloggs.
Other manufacturers interpreted this lack of FDA action as an invitation
to flood the marketplace with health-related claims as a part of their
marketing schemes. 52 While this led to an increase in healthier foods and
more health information in the market, it also encouraged many
companies to attach unsubstantiated and even misleading health claims
to their products under the notion that the FDA would take no action. 53 In
1987, the FDA proposed a rule that would have permitted health claims
relating to "diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of human
54
disease" to be used without requiring FDA pre-approval. Although the
flexibility apparent in the 1987 proposed rule and the outpouring of new
health claims that followed the Kelloggs affair had the positive effect of
increasing the number of healthful foods on the market, the proposed rule
spurred industry concerns, and numerous comments were submitted to
the FDA encouraging the agency to develop a definitive health claim
policy. 55 In response to this outpouring of concern, the FDA prepared to
propose new regulations in 1990 that would substantially return the
approval of health claims to the hostile atmosphere that existed before
the Kelloggs phenomenon. 56 This attempt, however, was cut short by
Congress's passage of the Nutrition and Labeling Act of 1900.
In 1990, Congress anticipated the proposed system of policies under
preparation by the FDA, and passed its own regulation, the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). 57 Industry lobbyists and
scholarly commentators who had cautioned about First Amendment
problems during the notice and comment period for the FDA proposed
regulations were virtually ignored by Congress during the debate
58
preceding passage of the NLEA. With the passage of the NLEA,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 662.
See Blim, supra note 10, at 736; Cooper, et al., supra note 41, at 662-63.
See Cooper, et al., supra note 43, at 662-63 ( 1990).
H.R. Rep. 101-980, at 7 and 23 (1990).
See Cooper, et al., supra note 43, at 661.
See id. at 666.
See id. at 691.
Pub. L. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990).
See Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 632-33. These cautions were presumably
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Congress required the FDA to formulate regulations for health claims
within twelve months under a "significant scientific agreement
standard." 59 The FDA was directed to use a rulemaking process rather
than a case-by-case, adjudicatory method to approve or disapprove of
health claims, and Congress left the working definition of the
"significant scientific agreement" standard to the FDA's discretion,
leaving the agency free to "require near unanimity among scientists"
regarding the validity of a claim before the agency would approve its
60
use.
Under the final FDA NLEA regulations, a dietary supplement
manufacturer may only include a health claim on the label of the
supplement if that health claim has been previously approved in FDA
regulations. 61 If the health claim has not been approved in an FDA
regulation, the organization may petition the FDA for an allowance,
abandon the claim, or seek judicial review of the agency's decision. 62
The FDA has only approved eight health claims to date, and only one
63
seems to be applicable to dietary supplements, thus illustrating the
agency's immense power to limit access to health information. 64 The
agency codified its "procedure" for authorizing health claims in 21
C.P.R.§ 101.14(c) as follows:
[T]he FDA will establish a regulation approving a health claim only
when it determines, based on the totality of publicly available scientific
evidence (including evidence from well-designed studies conducted in
a manner which is consistent with generally recognized scientific
procedures and principles), that there is significant scientific agreement
among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence. 65

In practice, this standard of "significant scientific agreement" has
proven to be ill-defined and virtually impossible to satisfy, as will be
seen below. 66 In addition, if a company attaches an unapproved health
claim to a label, this "exposes the company and its officials to criminal
overlooked in an attempt to accommodate varying heated viewpoints among legislators regarding the
policy at issue in health claim regulation. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 101-980 (1990), for a clear
view of the partisan divisiveness in Congress regarding the NLEA and FDA health claims regulation
in general.
59. Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 633.
60. Blim, supra note 10, at 739.
61. See id. at 740.
62. See id. at 742.
63. See Melinda Ledden Sidak, Dietary Supplements and Commercial Speech, 48 FooD &
DRUG L.J. 441,450-51.
64. See Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 635.
65. Health Claims: General Requirements, 21 C.P.R.§ 101.14(c).
66. See Sidak, supra note 63, at 452-61.
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prosecution" even if the claim is "truthful and fully substantiated" but
merely failed to meet the FDA's discretionary standard. 67 This result
seems to stand in clear violation of First Amendment principles.
III.

PEARSON V. SHALALA

Durk Peterson and Sandy Shaw, dietary supplement marketers,
desired to present four health claims on their dietary supplement labels.
The labels read as follows: (I) consumption of antioxidant vitamins may
reduce the risk of certain kinds of cancer; (2) consumption of fiber may
reduce the risk of colorectal cancer; (3) consumption of fatty acids may
reduce the risk of coronary heart disease; (4) .8 mg. of folic acid in a
dietary supplement is more effective in reducing the risk of neural tube
defects than a lower amount in foods in common form. 68 The FDA
refused to certify any of these claims, although it later allowed a more
general health claim regarding the foliate-neural tube defect claim
purportedly because of political pressure, and not additional scientific
justification. 69 The FDA explained that the rejection of these health
claims was based, not on lack of scientific evidence of their verity, but
rather because they "failed to give rise to 'significant scientific
agreement."' 70 The agency, however, failed to explain how it defined or
measured "significant scientific agreement." 71
Pearson and Shaw brought an action in federal district court seeking
relief from this FDA decision based on three main theories: (1) the FDA
violated their First Amendment rights by refusing to employ a less
restrictive means of regulation, thus allowing them to include health
claims on labels along with disclaimers stating that the FDA had not
approved the claims; (2) the FDA failed to explain the meaning and
measurement of "significant scientific agreement" and effectively
imposed a prior restraint on communication that both violates the
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech and deprives them of
their liberty in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process;
and (3) the FDA engaged in arbitrary and capricious action under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to "give some
definitional content" to "significant scientific agreement." 72 The district
court rejected all of these claims. 73
67. See Dunkelberger & Taylor, supra note 43, at 634-36.
68. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 652.
69. See id. at 653. The FDA denies that mere political pressure caused the agency to approve
the foliate-neural tube and asserts that new scientific studies justified the approval. /d. at 654.
70. /d. at 653.
71. /d.
72. /d. at 660.
73. See id. at 654.
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While the D.C. Court of Appeals acknowledged the merits of the
First and Fifth Amendment claims and extensively discussed the First
Amendment argument in some detail, it declined to decide the case based
on these theories. The agency action was a clear violation of the APA
and, therefore, consideration of these more substantive claims was not
necessary to reach the court's desired result in this case. 74 The court
reversed the decision of the district court and remanded to the district
court with instructions to remand to the FDA for reconsideration of
75
Pearson and Shaw's health claims.
The court did, however, lend credence to Pearson and Shaw's First
and Fifth Amendment claims, noting the probability that these claims
may have merit and may be reached in a case in which the APA claim
does not exist. This case was the first seriously considered challenge of
the NLEA based on First and Fifth Amendment claims to reach a U.S.
Court of Appeals where the issues were ripe for decision and the parties
had standing to sue. Thus, the fact that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized the merit of these Constitutional challenges to the Act makes
it more likely that similar challenges will be brought in the near future if
the problems with the Act are not remedied through new legislation or
FDA regulatory solutions.
IV. THE CENTRALHUDSONTEST
A. First Amendment Violations

In its evaluation of the First Amendment claims, the court first noted
that the health claims are to be evaluated under the commercial speech
doctrine. 76 Therefore, the court's first inquiry was concerning the use of
disclaimers as an effective but less restrictive means of regulation than
the FDA's choice to completely suppress health claims on labeling. The
court considered two arguments made by the government in this area: ( 1)
the health claims are "inherently misleading" because they failed to pass
the muster of the "significant scientific agreement" standard and
therefore they are not entitled to any First Amendment protection and, in
the alternative, (2) the health claims are merely potentially misleading
under the Central Hudson analysis so the government may completely
ban the publication of health claims, without even considering the less
restrictive means of attaching disclaimers when the claims do not meet
the "significant scientific agreement" standard. 77
74.
75.
76.
77.

See
See
See
See

Pearson, 164 F.3d at 660.
id. at 661.
id. at 655.
id.
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The court first derailed the government's argument that the health
claims were inherently misleading, based on the notion that this was a
patronistic argument underestimating the sophistication and ability of
consumers to make choices based on the available information. 78 Then,
turning to the possibility of characterizing the health claims as
"potentially misleading" under the Central Hudson scheme, the court
determined that commercial speech may be a proper classification of the
health claims because of the difficulty that the independent consumer
would face in trying to independently verify the claim and the possibility
that the consumer might assume that the FDA had approved the claims
attached to a label. 79
Because the health claims could possibly be classified as "potentially
misleading," the court was obliged to apply the next three parts of the
Central Hudson test. The court determined that the "asserted government
interests" in this instance, "protection of public health" and "protection
of consumer fraud", were "substantial." 80 However, the court faced the
last two steps of the test with more difficulty. At this point in the
analysis, the test requires that the court determine whether the regulation
"directly advances the government interest asserted" 81 and whether the
82
government regulation is a "reasonable" means to achieve the desired
end.
As to the first asserted government interest, protection of public
health, the court again noted that the dietary supplements at issue are not
dangerous in themselves and the government cannot completely suppress
a communication merely to cause the consumer to better spend his or her
health dollars. Once again, this was based on the reasoning that the court
should be wary of government regulations that attempt to hide
information from the public as the government acts for 'the consumer's
83
own good.' Therefore, the court's analysis of the FDA's public health
argument ended at the third step in the Central Hudson analysis. Here,
however, the court saw more merit in the FDA's consumer fraud
argument, that complete suppression of health claims would prevent
consumer fraud and confusion, and thus "directly advance the

78. See id. The court cited the Peel opinion which states that this patronistic method of
determining that a communication is inherently misleading is tantamount to a determination that
consumers are "no more discriminating than the audience for children's television." !d. (quoting Peel
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 496 U.S. 91, 1OS ( 1990)).
79. Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 655.
80. !d. at 656.
81. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
82. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
83. Pearson, 164 F.3d at 656.
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governmental interest asserted." 84 Therefore, the court subjected the
consumer fraud argument to the "reasonable fit" standard of the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test.
As a part of the fourth prong analysis, the court noted that, under
Supreme Court precedent, even when the court determines that the
government's regulation "reasonably fits" its purpose, the regulation
does not pass muster if it is "substantially excessive" and disregards a
"far less restrictive and more precise means." 85 Under this reasoning, the
court stated that the Supreme Court, in a series of commercial speech
cases, has affirmed its dedication to the idea that the preference is for
more communication rather than less, making a disclaimer preferable to
complete suppression if this less restrictive means fulfills the
government's purpose. 86 The court expressed confidence that disclaimers
would meet the government's purpose in this instance, but left this
decision to the discretion of the agency on remand.
The court next gave a cursory glance to Pearson and Shaw's
argument that the regulations were a "prior restraint" on speech and, as
such, were prohibited under the First Amendment. Appellants argued
that the failure of the agency to sufficiently define the phrase "significant
scientific agreement" was effectively a prior restraint because it does not
inform labelers of the method by which the FDA determines that a label
satisfies the "significant scientific agreement" standard. 87 In other words,
the appellants had the burden of proving "significant scientific
agreement," but they were unaware of the standard of proof required by
the FDA. This argument was largely skimmed over because the
appellants did not fully articulate their argument on this issue, but the
court was quick to note that this may have been a fruitful claim if
Pearson and Shaw had pursued this argument further. 88
B. The Unarticulated Standard

Continuing its analysis that the FDA's failure to give some "content"
to the "significant scientific agreement" standard, the court next turned to
Pearson and Shaw's argument that they had been deprived of a liberty
under the Fifth Amendment without due process. 89 Pearson and Shaw
had argued that they had not been accorded sufficient due process

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

!d. at 656.
!d. at 658 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 479).
See id. at 657.
!d. at 660.
See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 660.
See id.
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because of the vagueness of the agency's "significant scientific
90
agreement" standard. However, the court did not fully consider this
argument because it determined that this vagueness also made the FDA's
action "arbitrary and capricious" under the APA and that Pearson and
Shaw would receive the same relief under the APA that they would be
entitled to under the Fifth Amendment. 91
Although the court required the FDA to give content to the term
"significant scientific agreement" on remand, the court clearly stated that
the FDA was not required to provide a complete definition in this one
instance. 92 Congress had granted the FDA authority to regulate health
claims on dietary supplements through a system of regulatory
rulemaking, not adjudication, and this grant of authority presupposed that
the agency could create a working definition on a "sub-regulation by
sub-regulation" basis. 93 In the end, the court only required that the
regulated class be able to "perceive the principles which are guiding
,94
agency actwn.
0

V. ANALYSIS

Pearson highlights several of the problems with the current
formulation of health claim regulation in the context of First Amendment
analysis and the public interests involved in the publication of health
claims. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals did not delve to the bottom of
the situation in this instance to determine the constitutionality of the
FDA's sub-regulations under the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act
of 1990, because the relief sought by Pearson and Shaw was available
through a less drastic method. 95 However, the dicta of the court's opinion
lends credence to the idea that future litigation may invalidate the FDA's
Nutritional Labeling and Education Act procedure if (1) the claimants
fully explicate their First and Fifth Amendment causes of action and (2)
the court chooses to afford relief under a constitutional rubric rather than
an APA violation. 96 While there is clearly a need for FDA regulation of
dietary supplements, the FDA's heavy-handed NLEA regulations both
undermine the legislative purpose behind the NLEA and abridge the
constitutional rights of those class members affected by the regulation,
the speakers, and the public.
90. See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 660.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 661.
93. See id.
94. /d.
95. See id. at 660.
96. See id. See also Pearson v. Shalala, 172 F.3d 72, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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A. Trends in the Regulation of Dietary Supplement Health Claims

Congress clearly expressed the government's interest in regulating
health claims in dietary supplements in its "findings and purposes" for
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994. This piece of
legislation clarified that health claims for dietary supplements under the
NLEA are to be determined under the same standards as are health
claims for foods. 97 According to national studies conducted in 1994, at
least fifty percent of Americans consume dietary supplements with the
purpose of improving their nutrition. 98 The proliferation of health claims
following the Kelloggs claim in the 1980s itself substantiates the idea
that healthy foods and supplements are big business in America. 99 In
1994, studies estimated that 600 dietary supplement manufacturers
produce 4,000 products and account for annual sales of "at least four
billion dollars." 100 This wide-scale use of supplements may be attributed
in part to an increase in scientific validation of the health benefits of
supplement use. While the FDA and the healthcare community have
traditionally been hostile to the dietary supplement industry, scientific
studies have shown links between supplement use and disease
prevention. 101 These findings further emphasize the interests of the
government and the public in "improv[ing] the health status of United
States citizens" by supplementing traditional health care with more
holistic health practices to reverse the increase in healthcare spending,
which had reached one trillion dollars annually in 1994. 102 Indicators
show that Americans will continue this escalated use of dietary
supplements and therefore the government should have an interest in
ensuring that the public is making health decisions based on the most
reliable information available.
This governmental interest cuts both ways in the First Amendment
debate over FDA approval of health claims. The question is whether the
government should serve as the gatekeeper for health claims to better
ensure their accuracy, or whether the government's role should be to
protect the free flow of health information under the First Amendment
and to proliferate reliable information about dietary supplements to
counter less reliable claims that the free flow of information allows into

97. SeeS. REP. NO. 103-410, at I.
98. See 140 Cong. Rec. H11173-02, H11173 (daily ed.).
99. See H.R. REP. No. 101-980, at 7.
100. B. Clair Eliason, et al., What Physicians Can Learn from Consumers of Dietary
Supplements, 48 J. FAM. PRAC., 459 (1999); 140 Cong. Rec. Hlll73-02, Hlll73.
I 0 I. See Sidak, supra note 63, at 441.
102. See 140 Cong. Rec. at H11173.
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the public discourse. These competing interests are confronted in
Pearson and the underlying legislation involved in this case.
While the notion that health claim based marketing is big business in
America seems to validate the idea that the courts should apply the
Central Hudson commercial speech test to health claims regulation, this
conclusion is doubtful on closer analysis. If any speech with a relation to
industry can be classified as commercial speech, one might asks where
this places claims related to the science of traditional medicine. Clearly
there is a conflict between two areas of big business in America,
traditional and nontraditional healthcare, and the traditional medical
community is now beginning to take note of the idea that they must be
aware of nontraditional healthcare solutions, such as dietary
supplements, if they are to remain as reliable sources of health
information for their patients. 103 Congress, the FDA, and the courts must
look to the medical model of information dissemination to determine
whether the FDA's method of health claim sifting is appropriate under
the First Amendment free-flow theory. Where science and commerce
meet, the courts and the government, administrative and legislative, must
establish a new concept of speech protection that is more thorough than
the commercial speech standard in order to allow public access to the
noncommercial, scientific component of such speech. 104 The remainder
of this note will explore how this may be accomplished under the Central
Hudson regime or under the First Amendment's protection of pure
speech.
B. Commercial Speech Analysis

1. The first prong ofthe Central Hudson Test

The court in Pearson unquestioningly assumed that health claims
should be evaluated under the commercial speech scheme based on the
Central Hudson test. 105 The appropriateness of this categorization is
questionable, but even under the commercial speech standard, the FDA
NLEA regulation fails to meet the test on several grounds.
First, the Central Hudson test is intended to protect communications
that are true and non-misleading. The Supreme Court's entire reason for
creating the subcategory of commercial speech and providing it less
protection than pure speech was based on the notion expressed by Justice
103. See Eliason, et al., supra note 100, at 459.
104. See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberatin!? Commercial Speech: Product Labeling
Controls and the First Amendment, 47 Fi..A. L. REV. 63, 90 ( 1995).
I 05.

See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 655.
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Blackmun that commercial speech is somehow more objectively
106
"verifiable by the disseminator."
As Pearson demonstrates, health
claims may be objectively verifiable by the producer, Pearson and Shaw
in this case, but the truth of the claim is of little import because the FDA
imposes a subjective standard of verification on the health claim before it
is even published. In Pearson, there was not a "dearth of evidence" to
verify the health claim, 107 but, rather, the FDA imposed an arbitrary
subjective standard of truth.
Pearson and Shaw's health claims failed to meet an impossibly high
standard of "significant scientific agreement"-impossible because the
FDA failed even to specify in this instance what quality and quantity of
evidence would be required to objectively verify the health claim. The
very idea of a "significant scientific agreement" standard without
definition presupposes that the FDA is more capable of weighing the
sources of scientific information than are the scientific community and
the public.
This authority of the FDA to effectively declare the unreliability of a
health claim places the FDA in the position of a "peer review mechanism
108
for the scientific community." This extreme grant of administrative
authority is not consistent with either the concept of democracy or the
modern skepticism that industry lobbyists control the administrative
state. Scholars note that the New Deal notion of the 'all-knowing
administrative expert' has been replaced with the idea of the agency as
109
an educator that encourages "genuinely informed choices." Arbitrarily
determining supposed objective truth by sifting it through the sieve of
subjective FDA review does not further the purpose of ensuring informed
choice. An agency such as the FDA should not be given the authority to
subjectively determine the truth of a statement under the lesser protective
standard afforded to commercial speech, when the justification for the
lesser protection substantially rests on the idea that commercial speech is
more objectively verifiable than noncommercial speech. The
responsibility of verifying the claims should fall on the shoulders of the
supplement marketers and the experts in the traditional medical industry
who are natural competitors in this situation. Otherwise, the disseminator
is deprived of the right to prove truth in this instance, as Pearson and
Shaw's experience demonstrates.

106. Vir!(inia State Bd. of Phari1Ulcy. 425 U.S. at 751 n.2. Blackmun's footnote explanation, as
discussed earlier in the Note, also specifies that the differentiation is due to the increased durability
of commercial speech.
107. See Pearson, 164 F.3d at 653.
l 08. Noah, supra note l 04, at 96.
109. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 653.
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The FDA similarly fails to justify its regulation under the second
notion inherent in the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the concept
that misleading commercial communication is not worthy of protection.
Clearly the health claims in this instance are not inherently misleading. 110
When the FDA can only make a subjective judgment about the truth of a
claim, it should not declare the claim to be potentially misleading merely
because the agency believes itself to be more capable than the average
American to determine the value and accuracy of the claim. While the
average citizen may not have the resources or expertise to independently
verify a claim, the traditional medical industry and pharmaceutical
industry do have the resources, expertise, and motive to destroy the
credibility of false claims. When the same evidence of the claim's truth
or falsity is available to both the FDA and the public, the individual, and
not the FDA, should be considered to be the best judge of his or her own
best interest.
2. The final prongs of the Central Hudson test
After the court determines that the speech is not false or inherently
misleading, the remainder of the Central Hudson analysis is based on the
nexus between the government interest and the regulation. This is where
the health claims analysis is blurred because it appears that Congress had
a different interest or purpose under its NLEA legislation than did the
FDA in its NLEA regulations. The Central Hudson test doesn't account
for the philosophical shift occurring somewhere between Congressional
legislation and agency discretion. When it is unclear whether the
purposes of the FDA and Congress coincide, Congress's purpose should
preempt the agency's purpose because the agency is only acting under
authority delegated by the legislative branch. Congress has repeatedly
recognized in its legislation involving dietary supplements that (1) the
FDA has historically disfavored dissemination regarding dietary
supplement health claims, (2) the FDA's NLEA final regulations have
slowed the flood of permissible health claims to less than a trickle, and
(3) the FDA has not facilitated Congress's purpose to "provide more
. f ormatiOn
.
m
to consumers about supp 1ements. " 111 In a Senate report
regarding the DSHEA of 1994, Congress noted that FDA NLEA
regulation and subsequent enforcement attempts have had a chilling

110. Ironically, the Supreme Court's inclusion of merely potentially misleading speech in
Central Hudson embodies the patronistic reasoning that the Supreme Court claims to abhor in its
commercial speech jurisprudence, with Bates standing as the seminal case in recognizing this idea.
Bates, 433 U.S. at 375.
Ill. S. REP. No. 103-410, at 35.
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effect on commercial communication that is based on a well-grounded
belief in its verity. 112
Clearly the FDA is not furthering the superior government interest
with its NLEA regulations-consumers are being provided with less
health claim information and producers are being subjected to a prior
restraint on speech. The courts cannot allow the FDA's purely patronistic
interest to suffice as a "substantial interest" under the Central Hudson
test when it conflicts with the interest of Congress in increasing the flow
of health information and the public's interest in receiving health
information substantiated by a respectable degree of evidence. Therefore,
the questions as to whether the regulation directly advances the
government interest and uses a reasonable means to accomplish that end
must be answered negatively in this instance. In fact, prior to health
claim approval, dietary supplements are subject to safety approval if they
113
contain a new ingredient. The FDA can determine that the product
itself is unsafe for sale and subsequently remove it from the market; thus,
while supplements have been shown to be toxic at certain consumption
levels, the FDA cannot claim that its NLEA health claims regulations are
protecting the public from any real harm other than the consumer's own
. dgment. 114
f au Ity JU
3. The reasoning ofPosadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico applied to this case

While the FDA argues under the reasoning of Posadas that the
greater power to regulate the product assumes the lesser power to
regulate commercial speech about the product, the health claims scenario
is easily distinguishable from the fact situation in Posadas. 115 In
Posadas, the commercial activity, gambling, could have no positive
112. See id. "FDA presently writes to companies warning that severe enforcement action may
follow if a company does not cease ... making claims that the FDA deems violative. Under current
law, FDA may or may not do something further to enforce that opinion. A company wishing to
challenge the assertion by FDA may not do so because the decision is not "final agency action" and
therefore not ripe for review ... A company is then forced to make possibly disastrous economic
choices based upon a constant fear that enforcement may follow. A well-grounded belief in the
viability of a claim ... will often be overcome by the cost of defending an action that may not be
filed." (Congress attempted to solve this problem by requiring that enforcement action occur within
60 days of receipt of the threat from the FDA.).
113. Stephen H. McNamara, Dietary Supplements of Botanicals and Other Substances: A New
Era of Rel{ulation, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341-48 (1995).
114. See Pearson, 164 F. 3d at 659. (citing Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't. of Bus. and Prof! Regulation,
512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994), "If the protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force,
we cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to supplant the [government's]
burden to demonstrate that the harm it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree." Ibanez, 5I2 U.S. at 146.).
115. See Pearson, 172 F.3d at 73.
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effects on public health and safety; therefore, restricting advertising for
gambling would not withhold possibly beneficial information from the
public. Here, however, both the product itself and the suppressed
information have potential health benefits for the public. The Posadas
approach is thus distinguished from this case. In fact, the idea that the
FDA can prohibit the sale of dietary supplements if its ingredients do not
meet safety standards further supports the proposition that the FDA is
merely trying to protect the consumer from his own inefficient healthcare
spending and not from any real harm threatened by the product itself.
Thus, the Central Hudson test, accompanied by the clarification of its
progeny, fails to consider competing government interests and to give
sufficient weight to the interest of the listener-the public.

C. Inappropriateness of the Commercial Speech Classification
Not only does Pearson demonstrate that the Central Hudson test
fails to sufficiently evaluate essential public and governmental interests
involved in the regulation of health claims, it also illuminates the
possibility that: (l) health claims may not be properly classified as
commercial speech; and (2) the entire idea of the commercial speech
classification recognized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy may be
faulty under First Amendment principles.
The D.C. Circuit in Pearson skimmed over the classification of
health claims as commercial speech in one sentence, citing Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products 116 as support for this classification. The court in
Bolger recognized that the core definition of commercial speech
provided in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, "speech which does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction"', 117 is problematic where
noncommercial content is included with commercial content. However, it
classified as commercial speech advertisements of contraceptives, which
advertisements included information on public issues. The
advertisements/informational brochures were classified as commercial
speech based on a combination of three factors: (l) the concession that
the pamphlets were advertisements, (2) the reference to a specific
product in the pamphlets, and (3) the fact that the distributors had an
118
economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets. However, the Court's
actual motivation in Bolger was to prevent advertisers from superficially

116.
117.
Relations
118.

463U.S.at66-67.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharnwcy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
See Bol,;er, 463 U.S. at 66.
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including information about public debate in order to latch onto the
"constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech." 119
In the context of Pearson and the broader context of health claims
regulation, the communication involved is of an entirely different nature
than that which the Bolger court confronted. A health claim is in itself a
statement of science, a statement of public health information and a
statement with a commercial motivation; this more "pure" speech is not
merely an appended piece of information but is the communication in
question.
Critics have consistently noted that the mere fact that a scientific and
public health statement is communicated for a commercial reason does
not justify a lesser protection for that statement. 120 They cite a 1978 case,
Egg Nutrition v. FTC to support this contention. 121 In this case, the court
determined that an egg industry organization advertisement stating that
there is no scientific link between egg consumption and heart disease
was commercial speech because the purpose of the advertisement was to
induce consumers to buy eggs. 122 Critics then noted that the exact same
communication would be protected as "pure" speech under the First
Amendment if it were merely communicated by someone without a
profit-motive, such as a scientist or medical researcher. 123
Health claims clearly fall within this category of communications of
scientific information differentiated from pure speech because the
speaker has something to gain-a profit-motive-by publishing the
speech on a label. Thus, the motivations of the speaker, good or bad, that
are so zealously guarded in the protection of ordinary speech are actually
the sole reason that scientific communications such as health claims are
provided less First Amendment protection. This scrutiny of motivation is
irrational in the health claims context, and some fear that it will have the
consequence of eroding the protection of "pure" speech, which has
traditionally been rigorously guarded from suppression based on
124
In fact, some question the entire idea that commercial
motivation.
speech should be entitled less protection because it is profit-motivated,
stating that enriching the public discourse and making money are not

119. !d. at 68.
120. See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L.
REV. 55, 128 (1999); Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76
VA. L. REV. 627, 642 (1990); Redish, supra note 43, at 1446.
121. Egg Nutrition v. FfC, 570 F.2d 157 (7u' Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978);
Kozinski, supra note Ill, at 642; Stern, supra note Ill, at 128.
122. See Kozinski, supra note Ill, at 642.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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"mutually exclusive." 125 The very notion that Blackmun expressed in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, that commercial speech is entitled to
Jess protection because it is more easily objectively verified, may
damage his reasoning. If one assumes a reasonable and competent public,
the dangers of commercial speech are far Jess than those posed by "pure"
speech because the public is naturally more skeptical of commercial
speech and has more objective tools to test its validity. 126
In addition, if one believes that the market has a power to direct
itself, it will only seem obvious that the profit-motive of a dietary
supplement producer will be contrary to the profit-motive of another
market player, such as a producer of a supplement with similar effects or
a pharmaceutical producer, and this opposing market player will expose
the misleading nature of a health claim in order to promote his own
product. Thus, competition and profit-motive add an additional check in
a commercial communication setting that is not necessarily present to
such a degree in a noncommercial communication setting.
VI. ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR HEALTH CLAIM PROTECTION AND
REGULATION

The intent of this Note is not to suggest that Congress return the
regulation of health claims back to the "snake oil" stage where anything
is allowable. Instead, it is intended to suggest that the current system of
FDA regulation is unduly restrictive when one considers the public
interests involved and that judicial classification of health claims as
commercial speech fails to adequately protect this category of mixed
scientific and commercial communication. In order to create a more
balanced approach, Congress should require that the FDA thoroughly
describe its "significant scientific agreement" standard in order to ensure
that it is not imposing a prior restraint by virtue of its vagueness, as
Pearson and Shaw asserted in Pearson. In addition, the courts should
reconsider their classification of mixed scientific and commercial
communications, such as health claims on dietary supplements, as
commercial speech and avoid dividing speech along motivational lines.
Health claims are health information and, therefore, it seems appropriate
to consider the traditional model of medical communication when
125. FREDERICK SCHAUER. FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY, 158 (University of
Cambridge Press) (1982).
126. See Redish, supra note 43, at 1455; Kozinski, supra note 120, at 644. Kozinski, in
particular, notes that the First Amendment assumes that the public is wise enough to filter the
political communications of white supremacists and the neo-Nazis, so it is illogical to assume that
the public would believe that a commercial speaker would take an impartial view of the health
benefits of his or her product.
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determining the appropriate method of regulation and judicial
adjudication.
A. Medical Model of Communication in a Legal Context

Physicians have the legal duty to inform their patients of the dangers
and benefits of proposed medical procedures, prescriptions, and
recommendations. This notion of informed consent that is so intrinsic to
the legal doctor/patient relationship is based on the assumption that the
patient, although less scientifically sophisticated than the physician,
should be the judge of his or her own best interest. The doctor is
instructed to "first do no harm" but to provide the patient with all of the
information material to his or her health. In the end, the party responsible
for making a final determination as to the course of action is the patient;
the patient is the final guardian of his or her own health. This paradigm
should be carried over into the creation of health claims regulation and
First Amendment protection of health claims.
Some may argue that Congress and the FDA have already adopted
this concept by attempting to ensure that the information received by the
public is accurate and not misleading. However, if we apply this analogy
more closely, the physician is the dietary supplement producer, the
supplier of the nontraditional healthcare, and the patient is the consumer.
While it is true that a supplement producer may not be entitled to as
much credibility as a physician because of lack of credentials, presence
of profit-motive, and other factors, one cannot automatically assume that
Congress and the agency are any more qualified or suited to sift health
information and to determine the validity of health claims. This idea is
strengthened by the notion that, although supplement producers are
acting based on profit-motive, Congress and the agency are acting based
on industry politics and lobbying efforts by the medical community and
the pharmaceutical and nutraceutical industry .127
In addition, because the nature of health claims is often such that
science cannot conclusively prove the validity of the claims beyond all
doubt, the government should adopt the philosophy of "epistemological
humility" and should recognize that it is no more the official determiner
of "true science" than is the scientific community, the source of these
health claims. 128 Therefore, the FDA should not set the level of proof
inordinately high in order to preclude health claims as it has in the past.
127. In fact, the court in Pearson noted that the eventual approval of the neural tube
defect/folic acid health claim was purportedly based on the pressure of political figures such as
Senator Hatch, who was undoubtedly influenced by nutraceuticallobbyists.
128. See Redish, supra note 43, at 1433.
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Congress has clearly expressed that the purpose of its enabling
legislation is to increase the flow of health information about dietary
supplements to facilitate better consumer choice. 129Any legislation,
agency regulation, and judicial classification of health claims, should be
reformed under the assumption that the consumer, the patient so to
speak, is the final judge of his or her best interest and can only make
accurate decisions if all of the information is before him or her. While
the notion that the medical model of communication should be applied
by analogy to dietary supplement health claims may seem contradictory,
considering the fact that the FDA more tightly regulates cause and effect
claims of pharmaceuticals than it does health claims in dietary
supplements, this is not an insurmountable criticism. Pharmaceuticals
rightly fit under a more restrictive standard than dietary supplements.
First, the cause and effect of pharmaceuticals is intended to be more
immediate and verifiable than the preventative or holistic effects of
dietary supplements. Second, although dietary supplements may develop
a toxic effect at extremely high levels of consumption, pharmaceuticals
are generally more toxic and can have much more severe detrimental
effects at a low level of use. 130
B. FDA's "Significant Scientific Agreement" Standard and the First
Amendment under a Medical Model of Communication

Because the health claim is merely a scientific statement published
as a result of a profit-motive, it should be accorded the same First
Amendment protection that the statement would be accorded if it were
pronounced by someone, such as a scientist, with no underlying profitmotive. The most logical solution to the health claims problem is to
require by regulation that producers desiring to make health claims on
dietary supplements give notice of the intended claim to the FDA upon
publication. The health claim would not be subject to the rigorous yet
vague approval process that is now in place because this is, as Pearson
and Shaw argued, a prior restraint under the First Amendment. The FDA
then has access to any published health claims, and in cases where the
health claim falls in the gray 'potentially misleading' area because it
does not comport with the weight of available scientific evidence, the
FDA should be authorized to take adjudicatory action against the
publisher.
129. 140 Cong. Rec. at H11173.
130. See xeneral/y Thomas D. Armsey & Gary A. Green, Nutrition Supplements: Science vs.
Hype, 25 PHYSICIAN AND SPORTS MED.77 (1997); Position r1{ the American Dietetic Association:
Vitamin and Mineral Supplementation, 96 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N 73 (1996).
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If the FDA finds that it can prove, to a degree that satisfies a court,
that the claim is factually false or inherently misleading, then the agency
can ask the court to enjoin the use of the claim and bring a charge of
consumer fraud against the producer. The courts should apply a clear
standard of scientific accuracy such as the judicial "reasonableness"
standard in order to determine whether a reasonable individual in the
light of total scientific evidence available could find this claim to be true.
This "reasonableness" standard is consistent both with the government's
interest in providing the average consumer with the most factual
information possible about the dietary supplement and the need to have a
clearly defined standard of proof that comports with standards of due
process under the Fifth Amendment.
If, however, it is impracticable to reclassify health claims as pure
speech because of the complexity of commercial speech jurisprudence
and the unwillingness of the Court to rethink the commercial speech
classification altogether, Congress should at least require the FDA to
formulate a clear standard of proof and put the burden on the FDA to
show that the communication would be found judicially false or
fraudulent. This finding could be connected by statute to a particular
standard of judicial review under section 706 of the APA. It is not
commercially practicable for those in the class affected by the restraint
on speech (i.e. dietary supplement producers) to guess the nature of the
FDA's "significant scientific agreement" standard and determine
whether their claim will survive FDA scrutiny based on a sub-regulation
by sub-regulation analysis of past FDA action. FDA NLEA regulation as
it now stands has a chilling effect on health claims communications and
deprives the dietary supplement producers of their right to free
expression and the public consumer of truthful and non-misleading
health information. To provide some level of certainty, Congress should
require the FDA to define the term "significant" and to give substantive
content to the entirety of the term "significant scientific agreement"
beyond the ad hoc, evolutionary sub-regulation approach approved of by
the D.C. Circuit in Pearson.
C. Alternate Means to Protect Health and Safety

Regardless of the First Amendment conflicts inherent in the FDA
NLEA regulations, the FDA is confronting a very real problem in the
dietary supplement industry. The recent deaths caused by L-tryptophan
and ephedrine illustrate that dietary supplements are not as harmless as
their manufacturers may imply, labeling them as "natural" solutions to
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health problems. 131 In these instances, the FDA was only permitted to
step in and remove the suspect supplements from the shelf after the
damage had already been done. In fact, as Dr. Richard Friedman,
psychiatrist and director of the Psychopharmacology Clinic at New York
Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, discovered, the FDA "couldn't stop
[someone] from selling hemlock tea until the bodies piled up." 132
While the Nutritional Supplements Health and Education Act did not
amend the FDA's health claim requirements, it placed dietary
supplements in a twilight zone between foods and drugs. Although both
food and drug manufacturers have the burden of proving the safety of
their products to the FDA before placing them on supermarket or
pharmacy shelves, dietary supplement manufacturers need only prove the
safety of their products if they contain ingredients that have not been
present in the food supply prior to October 15, 1994, the date of
NSHEA's enactment. 133 The FDA may remove a dietary supplement
from the market if it is deemed adulterated, or poses "a significant or
unreasonable risk of illness or injury," but the FDA bears the entire
134
burden of proving supplement adulteration. This places the FDA in a
safety policing rather than a preemptive role. While it may be sufficient
to limit the FDA's authority to regulate health claim communication to
post publication action, the FDA should have more control over the
actual sale of supplements. If the FDA has made a preliminary
determination that the supplement is safe, the First Amendment argument
that consumers should be able to evaluate published information about
the product is not difficult to swallow. If, however, the agency has no
control over the general safety of the product because it was on the
market before the 1994 enactment of the OSHEA, then the First
Amendment argument is less convincing.
While health claims may be difficult to substantiate, it is much easier
to provide conclusive evidence that a dietary supplement is unsafe by
subjecting it to pre-market studies. In addition, proof of safety in the case
of supplements with a market history beginning prior to the 1994
enactment of OSHEA is even easier because a sufficient amount of time
has elapsed to allow the dangers of the product to be revealed. Therefore,
Rehnquist' s argument in Posadas, that the power to regulate the product
includes the lesser power to regulate speech about that product, may not
131. See Gina Kalata, The Unwholesome Tale of the Herb Market, N.Y. TIMES, April 21,
1996, at I.
132. /d.
133. See McNamara, supra note 13, at 341-38.
134. Bruce A. Silverglade, The Vitamin Wars-Marketing, Lobbying, and the Consumer, 13 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 152-54; Anthony Young & I. Scott Bass, The Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285-92 ( 1995).
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be as inapplicable to this case as it may seem on first glance. If the FDA
can keep the product off the shelf because it is unsafe, they should do so
and avoid the First Amendment debate over health claims. If the FDA,
however, has the power to keep the supplement off the market based on
objective evaluations of safety and yet considers the product sufficiently
safe to remain in the market, the idea of allowing uncertain health claims
on products should not be alarming, especially considering the court's
allowance of disclaimers in such instances. This solution gives the FDA
the ability to protect health and safety by keeping unsafe products off the
market while allowing the responsible consumer access to possibly
truthful information about products that pass that safety test and may
provide valuable health benefits. If a product is determined to be safe by
the FDA, a false statement about its possible health benefits is not
particularly dangerous and will at most cause harm to the consumer's
pocketbook if it is allowed to remain on a label until the FDA proves it
false. There seems to be no reason beyond government patronism to deny
the consumer access to possibly beneficial health information about a
product that has been declared safe.
Congress should revise its stance on dietary supplement regulation
and allow the FDA to require that dietary supplements be pre-approved
for sale solely based on a clearly defined safety analysis. Then, if the
manufacturer cannot prove under the courts' reasonableness standard that
the product is safe for use at levels advocated by the manufacturer or
generally practiced by the general public, the product should not be
allowed to enter the market, or should be removed from the market if it is
already present. However, once the safety-approved product is placed on
the market, the manufacturers should be able to place health claims on
the products that have not been pre-approved by the FDA. After the label
is in the market, if the FDA can conclusively prove in court that the
health claims are not true under a "reasonableness" standard, the court
should enjoin the manufacturer from using the label. If, however, the
product is safe and the FDA merely does not feel comfortable with the
health claim because it has not been affirmed by scientific consensus,
First Amendment principles dictate that the manufacturer should be
allowed to attach the claim, albeit with a disclaimer stating that the FDA
does not support the claim. By allowing the FDA to pre-approve the
supplement based on safety requirements and yet prohibiting the agency
from imposing prior restraints on health claims, Congress would be
permitting the agency to further its purpose of protecting health and
safety while respecting the First Amendment rights of the manufacturer
and the consumer.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The debate over the FDA NLEA regulation of health claims on
dietary supplements at issue in Pearson concerns basic principles of
American government. The questions involved in this inquiry pierce to
the center of free speech jurisprudence and the value of the free flow of
information in the individual's search for the best health solutions.
Pearson focuses the debate on whether the individual or the agency
should determine what is in the public's best interest. While the medical
industry and the government have a valid interest in keeping false and
misleading health claims out of the public discourse and the marketplace,
the FDA and Congress should not interfere with patronistic motives to
impose prior restraints on labeling and to sift health information to
protect the consumer's best interest. If a health claim lies in the gray area
of science where connections between health and particular nutrients are
unclear, legislation and regulation should favor the policy that the
healthcare consumer should be provided with more rather than less
information whenever possible, based on the theory that the individual is
the appropriate determiner of his or her own best interest. This theory is
consistent with the model of communication in traditional medicine,
fully inform the patient of all possible benefits, risks and uncertainties
and then leave the final choice to him whenever possible. If Congress
grants the FDA the authority to require the safety of dietary supplements
before they enter the market, the possibility that some false health claims
will enter the marketplace may be threatening to the consumer's
pocketbook but not to her health.
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